Erwin
Tegtmeier
There
are three distinctions in the philosophy of time which I want to examine. It is
worthwhile to examine them because they are basic. I mean the distinctions
between A-series and B-series, between synchronic and diachronic identity, and
between perdurance and endurance.
1.
McTaggart's
Two Kinds of Series
It was
the Hegelian McTaggart who first distinguished between the A-series and the
B-series. Following C. D. Broad, who extensively commented on McTaggart's
philosophy, this distinction was adopted by almost all analytic philosophers of
time, though they disagreed with the conclusion to which McTaggart arrived on
the basis of that distinction, namely that time is unreal. Today, philosophers
of time even group themselves as either A-theorists or B-theorists.
However,
McTaggart's distinction arises from a misunderstanding of Russell's ontology of
time. He calls the series generated by the relation 'earlier than' "B-series"
and takes it to be the time according to Russell's view. The A-series, which he
contrasts to the B-series, is generated by the tenses present, past, and
future. He analyses the tenses as relations to a present.
Now,
McTaggart emphasises that the A-series changes (what is future to a present,
becomes present and finally past with respect to it etc.) while the B-series
does not. Then he argues that the gist of time is change and that therefore the
B-series is not really temporal. He characterises the B-series as static and
the earlier-relation as a mere temporal order relation. Now, what he actually
does is a bit more complicated (he
introduces a pure order series, the C series, and derives the A-series by
combining A-series and C-series), nonetheless it comes down to the opposition
between A series and B series which has become standard. Only the A series
brings and represents change, the B-series does not. So, McTaggart thought and
so the A- and the B-theorists today think.
But the
popular opposition of order and dynamics mislead here. When Russell describes a
relation as an order relation, he means only that it obeys certain formal laws
and he does not imply at all that it is somehow static. A static model of some
piece of reality leaves out the temporal dimension or, at least, takes into
account only what is simultaneous. In that sense Russell's ontology is not
static at all. It includes temporal relations and temporal relations other than
simultaneity.
As to
McTaggart's argument that the B-series cannot be temporal because it does not
change, it is misleading and wrong
mainly for two reason. Firstly,
the task is to analyse ontologically the general structure of temporal
phenomena, the task is to analyse the dynamics, not to dynamise the analysis.
The task of science, including philosophy, is to find out what the entities
involved in its research object are and what their laws are; it is to describe
and explain, not to imitate the object. Secondly, the A-series remains changing
just because the ontological analysis leading to it is incomplete: the changes
in the holding of the tense relations are
left out in the analysis. As soon as they are taken into account, we
have no longer a changing series.[1]
Let me
briefly symbolise and visualise what I mean. I begin with a McTaggartian
A-series:
F(e,g)
N(e,g)
P(e,g)
where e
is some event, g is a present, F is the relation 'is future with respect to', N
is the relation 'is present with respect to' and P the relation 'is past with
respect to'. Now, since F, N and P are incompatible, their conjunction would
lead to a contradiction. This contradiction does not appear because the column
of the three sentences contain an iconic representation, as Peirce calls it,
i.e., a representation by the
configuration of symbols (by the spatial downwards order of the sentences)
rather than by a symbol. It is just the iconic representation which creates the
impression of dynamics. As soon as it is transformed into a symbolic
representation this impression disappears. However, the transformation merely
makes explicit the complete analysis.
The
downwards order of the sentences is understood to represent an earlier-relation
between the event being future, present and and past with respect to g. No
contradiction arises because what the three sentences state is not meant to be
simultaneous. However, when the earlier-relation is represented by a symbol
(take E) and thus the analysis completed we get E(F(e,g), N(e,g)) &
E(F(e,g), P(e,g)) & E (N(e,g), P(e,g)). But this is a B-series. Similarly,
we arrive at a dynamic series, as McTaggart demands it, if we substitute in a
B-series the symbol for the relation which generates that series by an iconic
representation of it.
Undoubtedly,
a temporal phenomenon is always a change, if it is not a change in a persistent
object then it is a change in the situation, as, e.g., when two tones occur one
after the other. And an earlier-relation or rather a relational fact with the
earlier-relation from which change has been abstracted to have pure order is an
absurdity since the order is meant to be according to time. Order is always
order in a certain dimension.
Moreover, if one looks more closely how Russell introduces temporal relations,
one cannot discover any indication for the impossible attempt to abstract the
order aspect from the perceived
temporal phenomenon. On the contrary, in accordance with his empiricist principle of acquaintance
Russell introduces the relation 'earlier' ostensively[2]
with respect to a full-fledged temporal phenomenon such as a sequence of two tones, e.g., a c-tone
and an e-tone. This phenomenon of the c-tone resounding and then the e-tone
resounding is as dynamic as anything can be and not at all static. Russell
explains that the relation 'earlier' is just the relation we hear holding
between these two tones.
2.The
Distinction between Diachronic and Synchronic Identity
The
terms “diachronic” and “synchronic” have been adopted from linguistics. “Synchronic”
means roughly “simultaneous” and “diachronic”
“non-simultaneous”. Thus “synchronic identity” refers to identities between
simultaneous entities and “diachronic identity” to identities between
non-simultaneous entities. Now, strictly identical entities, entities which are
one and the same (where there is thus only 1 entity involved), are always
simultaneous. Not all simultaneous entities are strictly identical, of course,
but all entities which are temporal and strictly identical are simultaneous.
Simultaneity is reflexive and strict identity holds only between an entity and
itself. That any temporal entity is simultaneous to itself is true
independently of whether the entity has a short or a long duration. That an
entity has a relatively long duration does not prevent it from standing in the
simultaneity relation to itself. Obviously, a long duration does not prevent it
from being strictly identical with
itself either. Therefore, all temporal entities whatever their duration are
simultaneous and strictly identical, which entails that “synchronic identity”
is pleonasm.
If "synchronic identity" is a
pleonasm, then "diachronic identity" is a contradictio in adjecto.
Being strictly identical implies being
synchronic (simultaneous) and being synchronic implies, of course, not
being diachronic (non-simultaneous). Thus the contradictoriness follows by the
law of hypothetical syllogism.
We have
noted already that even objects of long duration are simultaneous to themselves
and not later or earlier than they themselves. However, the relations 'earlier' and 'later' do
occur in connection with a persistent objects and that is what may mislead the
users of the term "diachronic identity" to think there is
non-simultaneity in such an object. Yet, this non-simultaneity concerns only
our contacts with the object, not the object itself. One contact with the
object occurs later or earlier than another. That does not make the object
later or earlier than itself, of course.
It seems that the term "diachronic identity" is used
to conceive of the persistence of an ordinary object through time and change.
We ordinarily like to say that a object "remains the same" or “remains
identical” instead of saying merely that it "persists". The former
phrase though implies already an ontological analysis of the phenomenon of
persistence, if it is used in philosophy, namely that persistence grounds on
strict identity, i.e., that the ordinary thing remains strictly the same while
changing. The phenomenon of persistence has to be taken to involve only the
relatively long duration and the continuity of an ordinary object. To claim
that there only one entity underlying this phenomenon implies already a
specific ontological analysis. As in any empirical science, the phenomena of
ontology are less clear and specific than their theoretical analyses.
On the
whole, there are three different ontological analyses of the phenomenon of
persistence:
1. the
substance analysis
2. the
strong serial analysis
3. the
weak serial analysis
According
to the substance analysis an ordinary object is simple and remains literally
the same in spite of its changes. According to the strong serial analysis an
ordinary object is a series of momentary things and remains literally the same
in spite of its changes and in spite of the circumstance that we meet diverse
members of the series at different times. We meet the same series though we
meet diverse members of it. According to the weak serial analysis only the
momentary stages of the ordinary object exist. Only the members of the series
exists, not the sries as a whole. Hence, it cannot be literally the same during time and change. According to
this analysis the persistence of the ordinary object is not grounded on strict
identity, but on close causal connections between its momentary temporal parts.
The main theoretical, ontological
difference in the background between the weak and the strong serial view is the
acknowledgement of a series as an entity in addition to its members which the
former view presupposes and the latter view does not.
Now,
what to make of the distinction between synchronic and diachronic identity? If
"diachronic identity" is taken to describe the phenomenon of
persistence, what about "synchronic identity"? If it were a synonym
of "strict identity of simultaneous entities", then it would be true
independently of what ontological analysis is right that diachronic identity is synchronic identity, with
the “is” being the “is” of strict identity. We noted that even permanent
objects are simultaneous to themselves. Thus, we arrive again at a non-distinction.
Even if
"synchronic identity" is taken to mean simply "strict
identity" it would still be true according to the substance and the strong
serial view that diachronic identity is
synchronic identity (i.e. strict identity), according to the substance and the
strong serial view. And the last "is" again expresses strict identity
and hence the sameness of diachronic and synchronic identity.
Obviously,
this strict identity does not hold under the weak serial view. However, under
the weak serial view there is diachrony (non-simultaneity), namely between
between the momentary stages of the ordinary object. Thus one could express a
complaint about the composite term "diachronic identity" pointedly by
saying that if there is diachrony (with objects as weak series) there is no
strict identity and if there is strict identity (with objects as substances or
strong series) there is no diachrony (non-simultaneity).[3]
The
tripartite classification into substance, strong serial, and weak serial views
is intended to be an alternative to Lewis' dichotomy and to be an alternative
that is based on a more sophisticated and sound ontological background than
that of Lewis.
3.
Lewis' Distinction between Perdurance and
Endurance
Lewis'
distinction concerns just the phenomenon called diachronic identity. i.e., the
phenomenon of the persistence of an ordinary object. He claims that there are
two kinds of ontological views of the phenomenon of persistence, those viewing
it as perdurance and those viewing it as endurance. I object that Lewis'
distinction is based on a wrong analysis of the phenomenon of persistence. He
defines persistence, perdurance, and endurance as follows:
"Let
us say that something persists iff,
somehow or other, it exists at various times; This is the neutral word. Something
perdures iff it persists by having
different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no part of it
is wholly present at more than one time."[4]
Clearly,
the issue is not existence but temporal location, more precisely the temporal
location of objects such as trees and houses and men. To indicate the dates of
birth and death of a person, e.g., is to locate the person temporally.
Which
are the temporal locations? Lewis refers to times. This is, strictly speaking,
absolutist talk. It presupposes the view that there are temporal absoluta, i.e.
a continuum of time points or a temporal continuum with time points as
boundaries. According to the relational view time there are no time points, not
even a relationalist equivalent of time points. The equivalents would have to
be relational properties and being
categorially different they could
not play the same roles as time points. Moreover, there are arguments against
the existence of relational properties.[5]
Therefore, Lewis characterisation of persistence and hence also his distinction
of the two alternative analyses of persistence is not exhaustive. It leaves out
relational analyses without noticing it.
The
relationist in the philosophy of time has to derive temporal locations from the
relation of simultaneity to entities used as standards of time measurement.
Now, the relation of simultaneity holds only between entities which have a
duration of the same length. That is why a persistent object cannot be located
at a temporal interval of short or even point-like duration.
Basically,
Lewis defines persistence as mutiple temporal location. This makes no sense for
the relationist. One may even wonder whether it makes sense for the absolutist
with time points. First of all, a persistent thing has to be located at an
interval comprehending various time points. In what way can it also be located at those time points? Is
it temporally not just too big for a time point?
It
seems that multiple temporal location prima facie does not make sense neither
in the relationtist nor in the
absolutist view. Only if one adds presentism can one see the basis of the idea
of multiple temporal location. This may be a surprise since Lewis is an
outspoken opponent to presentism. However, there are other indications of a hidden
presentism in Lewis' philosophy of time.[6]
Multiple
temporal localisation is strange, indeed. Localisation of a thing at all
time-points of its duration is like ascribing to a rod of a length 10 cm also
all the lengths shorter than 10 cm. More importantly, multiple temporal
localisation is totally inappropriate with respect to the phenomenon of
persistence. Temporally scattered or interrupted entities such as the beats of
a drummer are multiply localised temporally, but persistent object are by
definition and nature temporally continuous.
The
background of the strange idea of multiple temporal localisation is presentism
according to which, to put it in absolutist terms, only what is at the
respective present time point exists and what is at all the other time points
does not. Hence, according to presentism at each present time point the world
is restricted to what is at that time and therefore temporal location has to be
a piecemeal affair building on time points. Now, presentism seems to be the
Common Sense view but when explicated as a philosophy of time it runs into great difficulties and turns out
to be untenable.[7] The common sense view works to a certain extent
because it is not taken strictly, because, e. g., not momentary but extended
presents of various length are assumed. The main point is to restrict the world
to an extension where no change occurs since the aim of the restriction is to
avoid the contradictions of change.
The
tripartite classification into substance, strong serial, and weak serial views,
is, as was mentioned already, meant to be an alternative to Lewis' dichotomy.
Comparing the two classifications the question arises where to place the strong
and weak serial view in Lewis' dichotomy. Remember Lewis' wording “persists by
having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times”. It is not
applicable according to the weak serial view which implies that there is
nothing which persists and that the phenomenon of persistence is based solely
on the close causal connection between the members of the series. And the
strong serial view fits into Lewis' classification only if the series as a
whole is not located temporally. These are other respects in which Lewis'
classification is not exhaustive. It excludes several views of persistence.
Lewis
understands the ontological problem of persistence as the question whether a
persistent object has multiple temporal localisation or not. Against that, my tripartite distinction
amounts to the claim that the ontological problem of persistence is to tell how
much a persistent object is integrated or unified. The three views correspond
to three degrees of unity. The substance view assumes the highest degree of
unity in a persistent object, the weak serial view assumes the lowest degree.
[1] s. E. Tegtmeier: Der
Hyperdynamismus in der Ontologie der Zeit. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Brentano und
McTaggart. Logos 1 (1994))
[2]
s. B. Russell: On the Experience of Time. Monist 25
(1915)
[3]
The
distinction between synchronic and diachronic identity seems to have come up in
the attempt to make sense of Aristotle's metaphysics, see: E. Tegtmeier:
Individuation, Identity, and Sameness. A comparison of Aristotle and Brentano,
in: The Object and its Identity. Topoi Supplement 4
[4]
s. D. Lewis: On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford/Cambridge (Mass.) 1986, p.203
[5]
s.
R.Grossmann: Russell's Paradox and Complex Properties. Nous
6 (1972)
[6]
s. E. Tegtmeier: Warum Lewis' Unterscheidung zwischen
Mitdauern (perdure) und Währen (endure) verfehlt ist. in: Löffler (Hg..) Substanz
und Identität. Paderborn 2002
[7]
s. E. Tegtmeier: Der Hyperdynamismus in der Ontologie der
Zeit. Logos
1 (1994)
